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Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability 85 dicial power. Instead of suggesting that the judiciary can settle in any decisive way such contentious issues as abortion, affirmative action, federalism, privacy, race-based districting, and religious freedom, the record of the last two centuries points to a more modest and circumscribed role for the courts. 12 No doubt at various times in our history the Supreme Court has attempted a more ambitious agenda, but it has done so at great cost to itself and the nation. 13 Perhaps we are being unfair. Alexander and Schauer "engage in direct normative inquiry,"
14 considering democratic acceptance of what judicial supremacy "should" be. 15 Yet, even if it was understood that the Court should have the last word on the Constitution's meaning, judicial exclusivity would marginalize the Constitution by overwhelming the obligation to follow the Court's constitutional judgments with the competing policy-driven "obligations" of government officials. 16 In other words, absent the constraints imposed by social and political forces, the Court's constitutional judgments will be less relevant and hence less stable. The tugs and pulls of politics therefore make the Constitution more relevant and more durable.
I. PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION
Can the Constitution be preserved and honored without "a final interpretive authority for choosing among competing [constitutional] interpretations?" 17 For modem-day defenders of judicial supremacy, such as Alexander and Schauer, this question is little more than rhetorical. Suggesting that the "settlement and coordination functions of law" 18 are the Constitution's "chief raison d'etre," 19 judicial supremacy is heralded as the only way to protect "a single written constitution" from "shifting political fortunes." 20 This conclusion, however, 12 See infra Section II.A; notes 111-120 and accompanying text. 13 See infra notes 76-86, 101-104 and accompanying text. 14 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1370. 15 Id. at 1369. 1~ See infra Section II.B. Making matters worse, the Court might well attempt to demonstrate its last word status by purposefully distancing itself from populist sentiment through its decisions. 17 is not suggested in the text or structure of the Constitution, the framers' intent, historical development, or even Supreme Court declarations of its own status as the ultimate and final interpreter of the Constitution. 21 Instead, the overriding value promoted by the framers was a system of checks and balances, with each branch asserting its own powers and protecting its own prerogatives.
Alexander and Schauer dodge this historical bullet by reminding us that their inquiry is "normative" and suggesting that, in any event, " [t] he present, and not the past, decides whether the past is relevant."22 For an essay on whether a constitution ought to have an authoritative interpreter, this bit of trickery might suffice. For an essay on "The Constitution of the United States," however, it is selfcontradictory to argue that judicial supremacy is needed to defend the Constitution. Claiming a power for the Court that was never intended hardly preserves and defends the Constitution. Instead, this claim debases and threatens constitutional government.
The Constitution's text, its original intent, and intervening practice support a form of judicial review far more limited than that offered by Alexander and Schauer. Indeed, no specific language in the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to declare certain governmental conduct unconstitutional, let alone the exclusive authority to do so. Judicial review can be derived from some sections of the Constitution, but in almost every instance it is the power of federal courts to strike down state actions or to void congressional statutes that threaten judicial independence. 23 The debates that oc- 21 On Court declarations of its last word status, see infra text accompanying notes 58-75; see also Louis Fisher, The Curious Belief in Judicial Supremacy, 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 85 (1991) (discussing various Justices' interpretations of the Court's role). 22 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1370. 23 The specification that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby," U.S. Const. art. VI, makes clear that federal courts must review the actions of state governments. One might argue that congressional statutes not "in [p]ursuance" of the Constitution are subject to judicial nullification, but judicial review over the coequal branches represents a major aggrandizement and requires convincing evidence. Furthermore, in extending the judicial power to all cases "arising Under the Constitution," it was "generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature." 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter Records]. For example, cases of a "judiciary nature" would include congressional statutes that reduce the salaries of federal judges. However defined, the idea of cases of a "judiciary nature" is something far short of giving the Su-curred during state ratification conventions suggest that the framers believed judicial review of Congress was limited and the President had the power to independently interpret the Constitution.
24
Although there was some support for a broad conception of judicial review, 25 no one argued for judicial supremacy. 28 1 Annals of Congress 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Yet in introducing the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, Madison predicted that once they were incorporated into the Constitution, "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive." ld. at439. Virginia Law Review [Vol. 84:83 While acknowledging that "the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary," he begged to know on what ground "any one department draws from the Constitution greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the several departments?"
29
Early presidents also believed that each branch of government should act as an independent interpreter of the Constitution. George Washington's first veto was on constitutional grounds. 30 Thomas Jefferson, viewing the Alien and Sedition Acts (which criminalized speech critical of the government) as patently unconstitutional, used his pardon power to discharge "every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law. "
31 Andrew Jackson announced his own theory of coordinate construction in a message vetoing legislation to recharter the Bank of the United States. 32 Since the Court had previously upheld the constitutionality of the Bank, 33 Jackson was under pressure to consider the matter as settled by precedent and judicial decision.
34 He disagreed: The Supreme Court's authority over Congress and the President would extend only to "such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. " 35 Jackson's position has been followed by every other President. Abraham Lincoln, in repudiating Dred Scott v. Sandford/ 6 argued that if government policy on "vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed" by the Supreme Court, "the people will have ceased to be their own rulers. " 37 Franklin Delano Roosevelt lashed out at the Lochner Court for taking the country back to the "horse and buggy" days. 38 and Bill Clinton's embrace of efforts to "reverse" Court standards governing religious liberty 41 also follow this pattern. For its part, ·Congress has launched numerous challenges to the Court. In response to Dred Scott, Congress passed a bill prohibiting slavery in the territories. 42 Disagreeing with the Court's 1918 ruling that the commerce power could not be used to regulate child labor, 43 Congress two decades later again based child labor legislation on the commerce clause. 44 Public accommodations protections contained in the 1964 Civil Rights Act similarly followed in the wake of a Supreme Court decision rejecting such protections. 45 More recently, lawmakers have challenged Court rulings on abortion, busing, flag burning, religious freedom, voting rights, and the legislative veto. 46 Judicial exclusivity, then, finds no support in Congressional and White House practices, in the debates surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, or in the Constitution itself. To the extent that language and tradition matter, 47 the argument for judicial supremacy is a nonstarter.
Alexander and Schauer, as well as others before them, have navigated this terrain, discounting the relevance of notoriously ambiguous texts and indications of intention which presuppose that the "intentions of long-dead people from a different social world should
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[Vol. 84:83 influence us." 48 When it comes to judicial exclusivity, however, the problem with "tak[ing] neither original intent nor intervening practice as authoritative" 49 is that there is not a scintilla of evidence supporting the Court's ultimate interpreter status. 50 Alexander and Schauer, for example, never explain how judicial exclusivity, a principle derived froin "the nature of law" can trump, well, the supreme LAW of the land. Suggesting that "preconstitutional" norms and "meta-rules" are more important than the Constitution itselt 1 is, in the end, not enough to pull off the impossible feat of demonstrating fidelity to the Constitution by disregarding its basic command about the separation of powers.
II. PROMOTING POLITICAL STABILITY
There may be an element of unfairness in our efforts to link the Constitution's design with interpretive theories intended to make the Constitution the "supreme law of the land." We do not, for example, consider the central question which animates Alexander and Schauer's admittedly "normative inquiry," that is, "[w]hat ... is law for?" 52 Yet, even assuming-as they do-that law's principal function is to "settle [matters] authoritatively" and promote "stability,"53 the argument for judicial supremacy falls short. Without the powers of purse and sword, "[t]he Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions." Moreover, as a matter of realpolitik, "non-deference is often good political strategy," and lawmakers and the President suffer "neither legally nor politically" for making "politically popular or otherwise attractive policy decisions ... flatly inconsistent with established precedent." Id. at 1365-66.
• as limited. Correspondingly, even if Court decisions were viewed as final, elected officials would sublimate their "duty to obey the law" to allegedly overriding duties more consistent with their policy preferences. This marginalization of the Constitution is directly at odds with the settlement function of law. For the Constitution to truly operate as a stabilizing force, it must be relevant to the lives of democratic government and the American people. Judicial exclusivity cannot accomplish this task; rather, stability can only be achieved through a give-and-take process involving all of government as well as the people.
A. Settling Transcendent Values
The history of the Supreme Court has been a search for various techniques and methods that will permit the judiciary to limit and constrain its own power. Justices understand, either by instinct or experience, that the hazards are great when the Court attempts to settle political, social, and economic matters best left to the political process. 55 Despite occasional utterances from the Court that it is the "ultimate interpreter" 56 of the Constitution, Justices by necessity adhere to a philosophy that is much more modest, circumspect, and nuanced. Rather than settle transcendent values, Court decisions, at best, momentarily resolve the dispute immediately before the Court.
The strongest support for this proposition, ironically, comes from those cases in which the Court has defended its authority to bind government officials through its interpretation of the Constitution. 
71
The Supreme Court's practice of declaring itself the final word on the Constitution's meaning when it feels especially challenged by the other branches is anything but surprising. Invariably, the Court takes a bold stand because it fears that the political order will ignore its command. These sweeping declarations of power cloak institutional self-doubts, much as a gorilla pounds his chest Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the military,73 the Court understands that it must act in a way that garners "public acceptance. 74 In other words, as psychologists Tom Tyler and Gregory Mitchell observed, the Court seems to believe "that public acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitutionthat is, the public belief in the Court's institutional legitimacyenhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions. " 75 1bis emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary seems to be conclusive proof that Court decisionmaking cannot be divorced from a case's (sometimes explosive) social and political setting.
A more telling manifestation of how public opinion affects Court decisionmaking is evident when the Court reverses itself to conform its decisionmaking to social and political forces beating against it. [Vol. 84:83 to maximize its power and legitimacy, taking social and political forces into account is an act of necessity, not cowardice. Correspondingly, when the Court gives short shrift to populist values or concerns, its decisionmaking is unworkable and destabilizing. 87 The Supreme Court may be the ultimate interpreter in a particular case, but not in the larger social issues of which that case is a reflection. Indeed, it is difficult to locate in the more than two centuries of rulings from the Supreme Court a single decision that ever finally settled a transcendent question of constitutional law. When a decision fails to persuade or otherwise proves unworkable, 88 elected officials, interest groups, academic commentators, and the press will speak their minds and the Court, ultimately, willlisten.
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Even in decisions that are generally praised, such as Brown, the Court must calibrate its decisionmaking against the sentiments of the implementing community and the nation. In an effort to temper Southern hostility to its decision, the Court did not issue a remedy in the first Brown decision. 90 A similar tale is told by the Court's invocation of the so-called "passive virtues," that is, procedural and jurisdictional mechanisms that allow the Court to steer clear of politically explosive issues. 91 For example, the Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it," not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 87 This is not to say that Court decisions at odds with popular will are always destabilizing. Our point, instead, is that the Justices must be somewhat sensitive to social and political forces to avoid a destabilizing populist backlash or repudiation of the Court. 83 The Court, for example, abandoned its decision in (1984) . A typical example of this strategy is the use of ripeness in 1955 to avoid deciding the constitutionality of a Virginia miscegenation statute. Coming on the heels of the desegregation case of 1954, the Court was concerned that striking down a law banning interracial marriages would confirm the imagined fears of critics of desegregation who warned that integrated schools would lead to "mongrelization" of the white race. Years later, after the principle of desegregation had been safely established and Congress and the President had forged strong bipartisan majorities to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court was then politically positioned to strike down the Virginia statute. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
9<The classic statement of this position is Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1959) . See also Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 6 (1977) (explaining that progress in politics "could be made and most often was made by compromising and taking half a loaf where a whole loaf could not be obtained. The opposite is true so far as the judicial process was concerned."}. 95 Bickel, supra note 91, at 49. %Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (1921). ~7 A number of studies explain how courts generally stay within the political bounda-Virginia Law Review [Vol. 84:83 opposes the policy of elected leaders, it does so at substantial risk. The Court maintains its strength by steering a course that fits within the permissible limits of public opinion. Correspondingly, "the Court's legitimacy-indeed, the Constitution's-must ultimately spring from public acceptance," for ours is a "political system ostensibly based on consent. " Under this account, courts should not bend to such lawless behavior; instead, elected officials ought to face up to their "obligation" to treat Supreme Court decisions as law. Accordingly, the current system, where courts take social and political forces into account, is seen as backward.
To say that the current system is, well, the current system does not answer Alexander and Schauer's admittedly normative inquiry. What if democratic government saw Supreme Court decisions as definitive statements of the Constitution's meaning? Would such a system, as Alexander and Schauer contend, "achieve a degree of settlement and stability" and "remove a series of transcendent questions from short-term majoritarian control?" 100 Of course not. A strict bifurcation-centering constitutional interpretation in the courts while allocating other policy decisions to nonjudicial actors-would put both sectors on widely divergent paths. Policymakers would believe the Constitution to be irrelevant, something to treat with indifference. Lawmakers would debate policy divorced from constitutional concerns. As a consequence, the Constitution would diminish in value and stature. If the Court viewed the Constitution as its exclusive domain, it would not moderate its ries of their times. See supra notes 72, 76.
98 Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 76, at 992. See also Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 75 (explaining that the public's acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitution improves the chances of the public accepting the Court's controversial decisions). 99 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1382. 100 ld at 1380.
opinions to take account of social and political forces. The two sectors would come to speak different languages, with courts increasingly out of step with the political institutions. Judicial exclusivity creates disincentives for the courts to function within the governmental orbit and, as such, is destabilizing. The failings of judicial exclusivity, we think, are best illustrated by Dred Scott, 101 a heinous decision that demands disobedience. At the time the case was to be decided, the Court was sufficiently confident in its "high and independent character" that Justice John Catron advised President-elect James Buchanan that, in the matter of Dred Scott, the Court would "decide & settle a controversy which has so long and seriously agitated the country." 102 Buchanan took the Court at its word: In his inaugural address, he assured the nation that the issue of slavery was before the Court and would be "speedily and finally settled. " 103 The judicial settlement was certainly speedy but not final. Two days later, the Court issued Dred Scott, propelling the nation into a bloody civil war that left, out of a population of approximately 30 million, more than 500,000 dead and another 300,000 wounded.
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Alexander and Schauer do not blink when making this argument. In language critical to their analysis, they answer "the challenge of Dred Scott":
108 "Given the inadvisability of designing a decision procedure around one case that might never be repeated, it is better to treat Dred Scott as aberrational, recognizing that officials can always override judicial interpretations if necessary, especially if they are willing to suffer the political consequences. " 109 Try as they might, it will not do to treat Dred Scott as aberrational. The Supreme Court regularly confronts divisive, emotional issues, issues where lawmakers and the public may well find "overriding values" that warrant civil disobedience. 110 Moreover, if policymakers treat Supreme Court rulings as final, some outlet will have to be found for expressing discontent with the consequences of disfavored Court rulings. In particular, knowing that they cannot engage in constitutional dialogues which challenge the underlying correctness of Court decisionmaking, policymakers may well engage in civil disobedience, especially when the voting public disapproves of the Court. Rather than "aberrations," such challenges may become an important part of public life.
Consider, for example, the willingness of democratic institutions to resist Court rulings on abortion, affirmative action, busing, child labor, the death penalty, flag burning, gay marriage, the legislative veto, school prayer, voting rights, and religious liberty.
111
Today, these challenges take place in the framework of give-and-take dialogues among the Court, elected officials, and the public. Were judicial supremacy to rule the day, however, some or all of these challenges might become "occasions for disobedience. "
112 Indeed, when Supreme Court decisions on the minimum wage, 113 abortion, 114 and religious liberty 115 already have been analogized to Dred Scott, there is good reason to think that such challenges will, in fact, take place. Whether or not they succeed, it is difficult to see how judicial exclusivity would either promote stability or nullify majoritarian control of transcendent questions.
Even if Dred Scott is truly aberrational, judicial exclusivity is likely to marginalize the Court and, with it, the Constitution. Democratic institutions will only take the Constitution seriously if they have some sense of stake in it. Alexander and Schauer do not disagree; for them, a virtue of judicial exclusivity is that political discussion "might be richer precisely for its lack of reliance on ritualistic incantations of constitutional provisions. " 116 Yet, by fencing out politicized constitutional discourse, the Court's educative function will be severely limited as will the enduring values of the Constitution itself. 118 for example, they would encourage lawmakers not to expand constitutional protections beyond the floor set by the Supreme Court. 119 By this interpretation, Alexander and Schauer would then disapprove of legislation authorizing disparate impact proofs in voting rights and employment discrimination legislation; legislation and regulation authorizing the assignment of women to combat aircraft; legislation
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and regulation allowing federal employees, including members of the armed services, to wear an item of religious apparel on their clothing; and other initiatives launched by democratic government in the face of Supreme Court decisions limiting individual rights.
120
By stifling public discourse in this way, the Constitution becomes less relevant. Constitutional arguments will no longer be used as a roadblock to stymie progressive reforms or, alternatively, to expand constitutional protections beyond the "floor" set by the Supreme Court. While Alexander and Schauer do not foreclose policyruaking on matters that implicate constitutional values, elected officials are discouraged from doing so and, when they do, they are forbidden from discussing those fundamental values that underlie the Constitution and, with it, the United States itself. The virtues of "settlement for settlement's sake" 121 pale in relation to these costs. These costs are particularly acute in two categories of cases that are outside the radar of judicial supremacy proponents. One involves underenforced constitutional norms, that is, matters that for one reason or another are not likely to make their way into court. 122 Here, it is left to democratic government to define the Constitution's meaning. Yet, if elected government is discouraged from thinking about the Constitution, it is unlikely that these matters will receive serious treatment, if any at all. The second category involves instances in which the Court sees itself as a partner with government in shaping constitutional values. As a way of minimizing error, miscalculation, and needless conflicts with sosiety and coequal branches, the Court sometimes enlists the help of elected government.
124 School desegregation is a particularly telling example of this practice. More than a decade after Brown, the percentage of African-American children in all-black schools in the South stood at ninety-eight percent. 125 Through the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other federal initiatives, however, this figure had dropped to twenty-five percent in 1968.
126 More significant, with the President, congressional leadership, and the public committed to undoing Jim Crow laws, the Court was emboldened to attack discrimination and segregation "root and branch."
127
Herein lies the real danger of judicial exclusivity. In rejecting such constitutional decisionmaking by other branches, judicial exclusivity does little to promote stability. It encourages acrimony, not cooperation. Democratic government, rather than engage the Court in a constitutional dialogue, will give short shrift to the Court and the Constitution. For its part, the Court will neither enlist democratic government's help nor look to public opinion as a measure of its legitimacy. No longer constrained by its responsibilities as educator (Why educate if populist constitutional discourse is not a public good?) and certain of its status as final constitutional arbiter, the Court will see little value in calibrating its decisions against of the "emoluments clause," a constitutional provision unlikely to be considered by the federal courts). 12 • The Court and Congress have acted jointly on many constitutional issues. See Fisher, supra note 6, at 247-51. An early example is Congress' response to the 1890 Supreme Court ruling in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). In Leisy, the Supreme Court ruled that a state's prohibition of intoxicating liquors could not be applied to "original packages" or kegs, but qualified its opinion by saying that states could not exclude incoming articles "without congressional permission." ld. at 124-25. Congress quickly overturned the decision by allowing states, through their police powers, to regulate incoming liquor "in original packages or otherwise." Original Packages Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1994) Pragmatism and statesmanship must temper abstract legal analysis. De Toqueville recognized in the 1830s that the judicial power "is enormous, but it is the power of public opinion.
[Judges] are all-powerful as long as the people respect the law; but they would be impotent against popular neglect or contempt of the law. " 129 Arguments to the contrary, that judicial exclusivity will have a stabilizing effect, won't do. To be stabilizing, court decisions must command respect and be generally acceptable and understandable.
C. Continuing Colloquies
Law, as Morris Raphael Cohen wrote in 1933, is anything but a "closed, independent system having nothing to do with economic, political, social, or philosophical science. " 130 As this study reveals, courts cannot be separated from the social and political influences that permeate all aspects of constitutional decisionmaking. The question of whether three-branch interpretation is qualitatively better than judicial supremacy, however, remains. Alexander and Schauer consider this question irrelevant to their analysis. Focusing on the stabilizing and coordinating functions of law, they embrace judicial finality as the best and only means available to save the Constitution from "interpretive anarchy." 131 We, of course, disagree with this claim. Perhaps more fundamentally, we think that the dialogue that takes place between the Court, elected government, and the American people is as constructive as it is inevitable and therefore more stable.
Constitutional decisionmaking is not well served by making challenges to Supreme Court decisions "more difficult," if not "futile." 132 
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[Vol. 84:83 complex task of interpreting the Constitution. Constitutions do not govern by text alone or solely by judicial interpretation. They draw their life from forces outside the courts: from ideas, customs, society, and statutes. Through this rich and dynamic political process, the Constitution is regularly adapted to seek a harmony between legal principles and the needs of a changing society. Bickel described the courts as engaged in a "continuing colloquy with the political institutions and with society at large," a process through which constitutional principle has "evolved conversationally not perfected unilaterally. "
139
III. CONCLUSION The chief alternative to judicial exclusivity is not "interpretive anarchy," 140 with each public official at every level of government making independent judgments of the Constitution. Nor is there any evidence that the main purpose of the Constitution was to vest a final interpretive authority in a single branch. The overriding value of the framers was a system of checks and balances that is antithetical to vesting in any branch a monopoly on constitutional values. The result, from the start, was "coordinate construction," 141 with each branch capable of and willing to make independent constitutional interpretations. That system has endured for more than two centuries without deteriorating into interpretive anarchy.
No single institution, including the judiciary, has the final word on constitutional questions. It is this process of give and take and mutual respect that permits the unelected Court to function in a democratic society. By agreeing to an open exchange among the branches, all three institutions are able to expose weaknesses, hold excesses in check, and gradually forge a consensus on constitutional values. By participating in this process, the public has an opportunity to add legitimacy, vitality, and meaning to what might otherwise be an alien and short-lived document. Therein lies true stability.
